Essaies.

Religious Meditations.

Places of perswasion and disswasion.

Seene and allowed.

LONDON
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Essaies.

1. Of studie.
2. Of Discourse.
3. Of ceremonies, & respects.
4. Of followers and friendes.
5. Of Sutors.
6. Of expence.
7. Of Regimẽt of health
8. Of Honor and reputation.
9 Of Faction.
10. Of Negociating.

To M. Anthony Bacon *his deare brother.*

LOuing & beloued Brother, I doe now like some that haue an Orcharde all neighbored, that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to preuent stealing. These fragments of my conceites were going to print: To labour the stay of them had beene troublesome, and subiect to interpretation: to let them passe had beene to aduenture the wrong they might receyue by vntrue Coppies, or by some garnishment, which it might please any that should set them forth to bestowe vppon them. Therefore I helde it best discretion to publish them my

ſelfe as they paſſed long ago: from my pen without any further diſgrace, then the weakneſſe of the Author. And as I did euer hold there might bee as great a vanitie in retyring and withdrawing mens conceites (except they bee of ſome nature) from the worlde, as in obtruding them: So in theſe particulars I haue played my ſelfe the Inquiſitor, and finde nothing to my vnderſtanding in them contrary, or infectious to the ſtate of Religion, or mãners, but rather (as I ſuppoſe) medicinable. Onely I diſliked now to put them out, becauſe they wil bee like the late new halfepence, which though the ſilner were good, yet the peeces

were

were ſmal. But ſince they wold not ſtay with their maſter, but would needs trauaile abroad, I haue preferred thē to you that are next my ſelfe, dedicating them, ſuch as they are, to our loue, in the depth whereof (I aſſure you) I ſometimes wiſh your infirmities tranſlated vpon my ſelfe, that her Maieſtie might haue the ſeruice of ſo actiue and able a minde, & I might be with excuſe cōfined to theſe contemplations & ſtudies for which I am fitteſt, ſo cōmend I you to the preſeruatiō of the diuine Maieſty. Frō my Chamber at Grayes Inne, this 30. of Ianuary. 1597.

Your entire louing brother
Fran. Bacon

ESSAIES.

Of Studies.

STudies ſerue for paſtimes, for ornaments, and for abilities. Their chiefe vſe for paſtime is in priuateneſſe and retyring: for ornament is in diſcourſe, and for abilitie is in iudgement. For expert men can execute, but learned mẽ are fitteſt to iudge or cenſure

To ſpend too much time in thẽ is ſloth, to vſe them too much for ornament is affectation: to make iudgement wholly by their rules, is the humour of a Scholler They perfect *Nature*, and are perfected by experience. Craftie men contemne them, ſimple men admire them, and wiſe men vſe them: For they teach not their owne vſe, but that is a wiſedome without them: and aboue them wonne by obſeruation. Reade not to contradict,

tradict, nor to believe, but to waigh and consider. Some books are to bee tasted, others to bee swallowed, and some few to bee chewed and disgested. That is, some bookes are to be read onely in partes: others to be read but cursorily, and some fewe to bee read wholly and with diligence and attention. Reading maketh a ful man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man. And therefore if a man write little, he had neede haue a great memory: if he confer little, haue a present wit, and if he reade little, he had neede haue much cunning, to seeme to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise, Poets wittie, the Mathematikes subtill, naturall Philosophy deep, Morall graue, Logike and Rhetoricke able to contend.

Of Discourse.

SOme in their discourse desire rather commendation of witte in being able to hold all ar-

argumentes, then of iudgement in diſcerning what is true, as if it were a praiſe to know what might be ſaid, & not what ſhold be thought. Some haue certain cõmon places and Theames wherein they are good, and want varietie, which kind of pouertie is for the moſt part tedious, and now and then ridiculous. The honorableſt parte of talke is to giue the occaſion, and againe to moderate & paſſe to ſomewhat els. It is good to varie & mixe ſpeech of the preſent occaſion with argument, tales with reaſons, aſking of queſtions, with telling of opinions, & ieſt with earneſt. But ſome things are priuiledged from ieſt, namely religion, matters of ſtate, great perſons, any mans preſent buſineſſe of importance, & any caſe that deſerueth pittie. Hee that queſtioneth much ſhall learne much, and content much, ſpecially if he apply his queſtions to the skill of the perſon of whõ hee

he aſketh, for hee ſhall giue them occaſion to pleaſe themſelues in ſpeaking, and himſelfe ſhall continually gather knowledge. If you diſſemble ſometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to know, you ſhall be thought another time to know that you know not. Speech of a mans ſelfe is not good often, and there is but one caſe, wherein a man may commend him ſelfe with good grace, & that is in commending vertue in another, eſpecially if it be ſuch a vertue, as whereunto himſelfe pretendeth. Diſcretion of ſpeech is more then eloquence, and to ſpeake agreeably to him, with whom we deale is more then to ſpeake in good words or in good order. A good continued ſpeech without a good ſpeech of interlocution ſheweth flowneſſe: and a good reply or ſeconde ſpeech without a good ſet ſpeech ſheweth ſhallowneſſe and weakeneſſe, as wee ſee in beaſtes, that thoſe that are weakeſt in the courſe

are yet nimbleſt in the turne. To vſe too many circumſtances ere one come to the matter is wearieſome, to vſe none at all is blunt.

Of Ceremonies and Reſpects.

HE that is only reall had needs haue exceeding great parts of vertue, as the ſtone had need bee rich that is ſet without foyle. But commonly it is in praiſe as it is in gain. For as the prouerbe is true, *That light gaines make heauie purſes*: becauſe they come thicke, whereas great come but now and then, ſo it is as true that ſmall matters winne great commendation: becauſe they are continually in vſe & in note, whereas the occaſion of any great vertue commeth but on holy dayes. To attaine good formes, it ſufficeth not to diſpiſe them, for ſo ſhall a man obſerue them in others, and let

let him trust himself with the rest, for if he care to expresse them hee shall leese their grace, which is to be naturall and vnaffected. Some mens behauiour is like a verse wherein euery sillable is measured. How can a man comprehend great matters that breaketh his mind too much to small obseruations? Not to vse Ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to vse them again, & so diminish his respect, especially they be not to be omitted to strangers & strange natures. Amongst a mans pieres a man shalbe sure of familiaritie, and therefore it is a good title to keepe state: amonge a mans inferiors one shall bee sure of reuerence, and therefore it is good a little to be familiar He that is too much in any thing, so that he giue an other occasion of satietie, maketh himselfe cheape. To apply ones selfe to others is good, so it be with demonstration that a man doth it vpon regard, and not vpon facilitie. It is a good precept

generally

generally in ſeconding another: yet to adde ſomewhat of ones owne, as if you will graunt his opinió, let it be with ſome diſtinction, if you will follow his motion: let it be with condition: if you allow his counſell, let it bee with alleadging further reaſon.

Of followers and friends.

COſtly followers are not to bee liked, leaſt while a man maketh his trayne longer, hee make his winges ſhorter: I reckon to be coſtly not thé alone which charge the purſe, but which are wearyſome and importune in ſutes. Ordinary following ought to challenge no higher códitions then countenaunce, recommendation and protection from wrong.

Factious followers are worſe to be liked, which follow not vpon

on affection to him with whome they range themſelues, but vpon diſcontentment cóceiued againſt ſome other, wherevpon commóly inſueth that ill intelligence that wee many times ſee between great perſonages. The following by certaine States anſwerable to that which a great perſon himſelfe profeſſeth, as of Soldiers to him that hath beene imployed in the warres, and the like hath euer beene a thing ciuill, and wel taken euen in Monarchies, ſo it be without too much pompe or popularitie. But the moſt honourable kind of following is to bee followed, as one that apprehendeth to aduance vertue & deſert in all ſortes of perſons, and yet where there is no eminent oddes in ſufficiencie, it is better to take with the more paſſable, then with the more able. In gouernment it is good to vſe men of one rancke equally, for to countenance ſome extraordinarily, is to make them inſolent, and the reſt diſcontent,

becauſe

becauſe they may claime a due. But in fauours to vſe men with much difference and election is good, for it maketh the perſons preferred more thankefull, and the reſt more officious, becauſe all is of fauour. It is good not to make too much of any man at firſt becauſe one cannot hold out that proportion. To be gouerned by one is not good, & to be diſtracted with many is worſe: but to take aduiſe of friendes is euer honorable: *For lookers on many times ſee more thē gameſters, & the Vale beſt diſcouereth the hill.* There is little friendſhip in the world, and leaſt of all between equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is betweene ſuperiour and inferiour, whoſe fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

Of Sutors.

MAny ill matters are vndertaken, and many good matters with ill minds. Some embrace

brace Sutes which neuer meane to deale effectually in them. But if they ſee there may be life in the matter by ſome other meane, they will be content to winne a thanke, or take a ſecond reward. Some take hold of Sutes only for an occaſion to croſſe ſome other, or to make an information, wherof they could not otherwiſe haue an apt pretext, without care what become of the Sute, when that turne is ſerued. Nay ſome vndertake Sutes with a full purpoſe to let them fall, to the end to gratify the aduerſe party or competitor. Surely there is in ſort a right in euery Sute, eyther a right of equitie, if it be a Sute of controuerſie: or a right of deſert, if it be a Sute of petition. If affection leade a man to fauour the wrong ſide in iuſtice, let him rather vſe his countenance to compounde the matter then to carrie it. If affection leade a man to fauour the leſſe worthy in deſert, let him do it without depraying or diſabling

bling the better deſeruer. In Sutes a man doth not wel vnderſtande, it is good to referre them to ſome friend of truſt and iudgement, that may report whether hee may deale in them with honor. Sutors are ſo diſtaſted with delayes and abuſes, that plaine dealing in denying to deale in Sutes at firſt, and reporting the ſucceſſe barely, and in challenging no more thanks then one hath deſerued, is growen not only honorable, but alſo gracious. In Sutes of fauour the firſt comming ought to take little place, ſo farre forth conſideration may bee had of his truſt, that if intelligence of the matter coulde not otherwiſe haue beene had but by him, aduantage bee not taken of the note. To be ignorant of the value of a Sute is ſimplicitie, as well as to be ignorãt of the right therof is want of conſcience. Secrecie in Sutes is a great meane of obtayning, for voycing them to bee in forwardneſſe may diſcou-

rage

rage ſome kinde of Sutors, but doeth quicken and awake others. But tyming of the Sutes is the principall, tyming I ſay not onely in reſpect of the perſon that ſhold graunt it, but in reſpect of thoſe which are like to croſſe it. Nothing is thought ſo eaſie a requeſt to a great perſon as his letter, and yet if it be not in a good cauſe, it is ſo much out of his reputation.

Of Expence.

RIches are for ſpending, and ſpending for honour & good actions. Therefore extraordinarye expence muſt bee limited by the worth of the occaſion, for voluntarie vndoing may bee as well for a mans countrey as for the kingdome of heauen. But ordinary expence ought to bee limited by a mans eſtate, and gouerned with ſuch regard, as it bee within his compaſſe

compaſſe, and not ſubiect to deceit and abuſe of ſeruants, & ordered to the beſt ſhew, that the Billes may bee leſſe then the eſtimation abroade. It is no baſeneſſe for the greateſt to deſcende and looke into their owne eſtate. Some forbeare it not vpon negligence alone, but doubting to bring themſelues into melancholy in reſpect they ſhall find it broken. But *wounder cannot be cured without ſearching.*

He that cannot looke into his owne eſtate, had need both chuſe well thoſe whom hee imployeth, yea and change them often. For new are more timerous and leſſe ſubtle. In clearing of a mans eſtate he may as well hurt himſelfe in being too ſuddaine, as in letting it runne on too long, for haſtie ſelling is commonly as diſaduantageable as intereſt. He that hath a ſtate to repaire may not diſpiſe ſmall things: and commonly it is leſſe diſhonourable to abridge pettie charges, then to ſtoup

ſtoupe to pettie gettings. A man ought warily to beginne charges, which once begunne muſt continue. But in matters that returne not, hee may bee more magnificent.

Of Regiment of health.

THere is a wiſdom in this beyonde the rules of Phiſicke. A mans owne obſeruatiõ what hee findes good of, and what hee findes hurt of, is the beſt Phiſicke to preſerue health. But it is a ſafer concluſion to ſay, This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not cõtinue it, then this, I finde no offence, of this therefore I may vſe it. For ſtrength of nature in youth paſſeth ouer many exceſſes, which are owing a man till his age. Diſcerne of the comming on

on of yeares, and thinke not to doe the same things still. Beware of any suddaine chaunge in any great point of dyet, and if necessitie inforce it, fit the rest to it. To bee free minded and chearefully disposed at houres of meate, and of sleepe, and of exercise, is the best precept of long lasting. If you flie Phisicke in health altogether, it wil be too strange to your body when you shall neede it: If you make it too familiar, it will worke no extraordinary effect when sickenesse commeth. Despise no new accident in the body but aske opinion of it. In sicknes respect health principally, and in health action. For those that put their bodies to indure in health, may in most sicknesses which are not very sharpe, bee cured onely with dyet and tendring. Physitians are some of them so pleasing and comfortable to the humors of the patient, as they presse not the true cure of the disease: and some other are so regular in

procee-

proceeding according to Art, for the diſeaſe, as they reſpect not ſufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or if it may not be found in one man, compounde two of both ſortes, and forget not to call as well the beſt acquainted with your body, as the beſt reputed of for his facultie.

Of Honour and reputation.

THe winning of Honou is but the reuealing of a mans vertue and worth without diſaduantage, for ſome in their actions do affect Honour and Reputation, which ſort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired: and ſome darken their vertue in the ſhew of it, ſo as they be vnder-valued in opinion. If a man performe that which hath

hath not beene attempted before, or attempted and giuen ouer, or hath been atchiued, but not with so good circumstance, hee shall purchase more honour, then by effecting a matter of greater difficultie or vertue, whe ein hee is but a follower. If a man so temper his actions as in some one of them he doe content euery faction or combination of people, the Musicke will bee the fuller. A man is an ill husband of his honor that entreth into any action, the failing wherein may disgrace him more, then the carrying of it through can honor him. Discrete followers helpe much to reputation. Enuie which is the canker of Honour, is best extinguished by declaring a mans selfe in his ends, rather to seeke merite then fame, and by attributing a mans successes rather to diuine prouidence and felicitie, then to his vertue or policie.

The true Marshalling of the degrees of soueraigne Honor are these.

theſe. In the firſt place are *Conditores*, founders of States. In the ſeconde place are *Legiſlatores*, Lawgiuers, which are alſo called ſeconde founders, or *Perpetui principes*, becauſe they gouerne by their ordinaunces after they are gone. In the thirde place are *Liberatores*, ſuch as compounde the long miſeries of ciuill warres, or deliuer their Countries from ſeruitude of ſtrangers or tyrants. In the fourth place are *Propagatores*, or *Propugnatores imperii*, ſuch as in honourable warres enlarge their territories, or make noble defence againſt inuaders. And in the laſt place are *Patres patriæ*, which raigne iuſtly, and make the times good wherein they liue. Degrees of honour in ſubiectes are firſt *Participes curarum*, thoſe vpon whome Princes do diſcharge the greateſt waight of their affaires, their *Right hands* (as we call them.) The next are *Duces belli*, great leaders, ſuch as are Princes Lieuetenants, and do them

thé notable ſeruices in the wars. The third are *Gratioſi*, fauourites, ſuch as exceede not this ſcantling to bee ſolace to the Soueraygne, and harmeleſſe to the people. And the fourth *Negotiis pares* ſuch as haue great place vnder Princes, and execute their places with ſufficiencie.

Of Faction.

MAny haue a newe wiſedome indeed, a fonde opinion: That for a Prince to gouerne his eſtate, or for a great perſon to gouerne his proceedinges according to the reſpects of Factions, is the principall parte of policie. Whereas contrariwiſe, the chiefeſt wiſdome is eyther in ordering thoſe thinges which are general, and wherein men of ſeuerall Factions do neuertheleſſe agre, or in dealing with correſpondence

to

to particular persons one by one. But I say not that the consideration of Factions is to bee neglected.

Meane men must adheare, but great men that haue strength in themselues were better to maintaine themselues indifferent and neutrall, yet euen in beginners to adhere so moderately, as he bee a man of the one Faction, which is passablest with the other, commonly giueth best way.

The lower and weaker Faction is the firmer in coniunction.

When one of the Factions is extinguished, the remaining subdiuideth, which is good for a second. It is commonly seene, that men once placed, take in with the contrary faction to that by which they enter.

The Traitor in factions lightly goeth away with it, for whe matters haue stucke long in ballancing, the winning of some one man casteth them, and he getteth all the thanks.

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Of Negociating.

IT is generally better to deale by ſpeech then by letter, and by the meditation of a third then by a mans ſelfe. Letters are good when a man would draw an aunſwere by Letter backe againe, or when it may ſerue for a mans iuſtification afterwards to produce his owne letter. To deale in perſon is good when a mans face breedes regarde, as commonly with inferiors. In choyce of inſtrumentes it is better to chuſe men of a plainer ſort that are like to doe that that is committed to them, and to report backe againe faithfully the ſucceſſe, then thoſe that are cunning to contriue out of other mens buſineſſe ſomwhat to grace themſelues, and wil help the matter in report for ſatisfactions ſake.

It is better to ſound a perſon with

with whom one deales a farre off, then to fall vppon the point at first, except you mean to surprise him by some short question. It is better dealing with men in appetite then with those which are where they would bee. If a man deale with an other vpon conditions, the start or first performance is all, which a man cannot reasonablie demande, except eyther the nature of the thing bee such which must go before, or els a man can perswade the other partie that he shall still neede him in some other thing, or els that he be counted the honester man. All practise is to discouer or to worke: men discouer themselues in trust, in passion, at vnwares, & of necessitie, when they woulde haue somewhat done, and cannot find an apt pretext. If you would worke any man, you must eyther know his nature, and fashions & so leade him, or his endes, and so winne him, or his weakenesse or disaduantages, and so awe him, or

thoſe that haue intereſt in him & ſo gouerne him. In dealing with cunning perſons wee muſt euer conſider their ends to interprete their ſpeeches, and it is good to ſay little to them, and that which they leaſt looke for.

Meditationes ſacræ.

OF the workes of God and man.
Of the miracles of our Saviour.
Of the innocencie of the Doue, and the wiſedome of the Serpent.
Of the exaltation of Charitie.
Of the moderation of Cares.
Of earthly hope.
Of Hipocrites.
Of Impoſtors.
Of the ſeuerall kinds of Impoſture.
Of Atheiſme.
Of Hereſies.
Of the Church and the ſcriptures.

Of the workes of God and man.

GOd beheld all things which his hands had made, and lo they were al passing good. But when man turned him about, and tooke a view of the works which his hands had made, he found all to bee vanitie and vexation of spirit: wherefore if thou shalt worke in the workes of God, thy sweat shall bee as an ointment of odours, and thy rest as the Sabbaoth of God. Thou shalt trauaile in the sweate of a good conscience, and shall keepe holyday in the quietnesse and libertie of the sweetest contemplations. But if thou shalt aspire after the glorious actes of men, thy working shall bee accompanied with compunction and strife, and thy remembrance followed with distast and vpbraidings, and iustly doeth it come to passe towardes

thee (O man) that since thou which art Gods worke doest him no reason in yeelding him well pleasing seruice, euen thine owne workes also should rewarde thee with the like fruit of bitternesse.

Of the miracles of our Sauiour.

He hath done all things well.

A True confession & applause: God whē hee created all things, saw that euery thing in particular, and all thinges in generall were exceeding good, God the worde in the miracles which hee wrought (now euery miracle is a new creation and not according to the first creation) would do nothing which breathed not towardes men fauour and bountie. Moyses wrought miracles and scourged the Egyptians with many plagues. Elias wrought miracles and shut vp heauen that no raine

raine ſhould fall vppon the earth, and againe brought downe from heauen the fire of God vpon the captaines and their bands. Elizeus wrought alſo and called Beares out of the deſart to deuour yong children. Peter ſtroke Ananias the ſacrilegious hipocrite with preſent death, and Paule Elimas the ſorcerer with blindneſſe, but no ſuch thing did Ieſus, the ſpirit of God deſcended downe vppon him in the forme of a Doue, of whom he ſaid, *You know not of what ſpirit you are.* The ſpirite of Ieſus is the ſpirit of a Doue, thoſe ſeruants of God were as the Oxen of God treading out the corne and trampling the ſtrawe downe vnder their feete, but Ieſus is the Lambe of God without wrath or iudgementes. All his miracles were conſumate about mans bodie, as his doctrine reſpected the ſoule of man. The body of man needeth theſe things, ſuſtenance, defence from outward wronges and medicine, it was he that drew

a multitude of fishes into the nets that hee might giue vnto men more liberall prouision. He turned water, a lesse worthy nourishment of mans body, into wine a more worthy, that glads the heart of man. He sentenced the Figge tree to wither for not doing that duetie whereunto it was ordayned, which is to beare fruit for mens foode. He multiplyed the scarsitie of a few loues & fishes to a sufficiency to victuaile an host of people. He rebuked the winds that threatned destruction to the seafaring men: He restored motion to the lame, light to the blinde, speech to the dumbe, health to the sick, cleanneſſe to the leprous, a right mind to those that were possessed, and life to the dead No miracle of his is to bee found to haue beene of iudgement or reuenge, but all of goodneſſe and mercy, and respecting mans bodie: for as touching riches he did not vouchsafe to do any miracle, saue one onely that

tribute

bute might be giuen to Cesar.

Of the innocency of the Doue, and wisedome of the Serpent.

The foole receyueth not the words of wisedome, except thou discouer to him what he hath in his heart.

O a man of a peruerse & corrupt iudgemẽt all instruction or perswasion is fruitlesse & contemptible, which beginnes not with discouerie, and laying open of the distemper and ill complexion of the mind, which is to be recured as a plaster is vnseasonably applyed before the wound be searched: for mẽ of corrupt vnderstanding that haue lost al sound discerning of good and euill, come possest with this preiudicate opinion,

that they think al honeſty & goodnes proceedeth out of a ſimplicity of manners, & a kind of want of experience and vnacquaintance with the affaires of the worlde. Therefore except they may perceiue that thoſe thinges which are in their hartes, that is to ſay, their owne corrupt principles, and the deepeſt reaches of their cunning and rottenneſſe to bee throughly ſounded and knowne to him that goeth about to perſuade with thé they make but a play of the words of wiſedome. Therefore it behooueth him which aſpireth to a goodnes (not retired or particular to himſelfe, but a fructifying and begetting goodneſſe, which ſhould draw on others) to know thoſe pointes, which he called in the Reuelation the deepes of Sathan. That hee may ſpeake with authoritie and true inſinuation. Hence is the precept: *Try all things and hold that which is good*, which indureth a diſcerning election out of an examination whence nothing

thing at all is excluded, out of the same fountain ariseth that direction: *Be you wise as serpents, & innocent as doues.* There are neither teeth nor slinges, nor venime, nor wreathes and fouldes of serpents which ought not to be all known, & as far as examinatiō doth lead, tryed: neyther let any man here feare infection or pollution, for the sunne entreth into sinkes and is not defiled. Neyther let any man thinke that herein he temp-teth God, for this diligence and generality of examination is cō-manded, and *God is sufficient to preserue you immaculate and pure.*

Of the exaltation of Charitie.

If I haue reioyced at the ouerthrow of him that hated me, or tooke plea-sure when aduersity did befall him.

THe *detestation or renoun-cing of* Iobe. For a man to loue againe where he is loued, it is the Chari-

rity

tie of Publicanes contracted by mutuall profite, and good offices, but to loue a mans enemies is one of the cunningeſt pointes of the lawe of Chriſt, and an imitation of the diuine nature. But yet againe of this charitie there be dyuers degrees, whereof the firſt is to pardon our enemies when they repent: of which charitie there is a ſhadow and image euen in noble beaſtes, for of Lyons it is a receyued opinion, that their fury & fierceneſſe ceaſeth towardes any thing that yeeldeth and proſtrateth it ſelfe. The ſeconde degree is to pardon our enemies, though they perſiſt and without ſatiſfactions and ſubmiſſions. The thirde degree is not onely to pardon & forgiue & forbeare our enemies, but to deſerue well of them, and to do them good. But all theſe three degrees either haue or may haue in them a certaine brauery and greatnes of the minde, rather then pure Charity: for whē a man perceyueth vertue to proceede

ccede and flow from himſelfe, it is poſſible that he is puffed vp and takes contentment rather in the fruit of his owne vertue, then in the good of his neighbors: but if any euill ouertake the enemie from any other coaſt, then from thy ſelfe, and thou in the inward-eſt motions of thy hart beeſt grieued and compaſſionate and doeſt no waies inſult as if thy dayes of right & reuenge were at the laſt come. This I interprete to be the height and exaltation of Charity.

Of the moderation of cares.

Sufficient for the day is the euill thereof

THere ought to bee a mã ſure in world ly cares otherwiſe they are both vnprofitable, as thoſe which oppreſſe the mind and aſtoniſh

ſtoniſh the iudgement, and pro-
phane as thoſe which ſauour of a
mind which promiſeth to it ſelfe
a certain perpetuity in the things
of this world: for we ought to be
daies-men, and not to morrowes
men, conſidering the ſhortneſſe of
our time, and as he ſaith: *Laying
hold on the preſent day*: for future
thinges ſhall in their turnes be-
come preſent: therefore the care
of the preſent ſufficeth: and yet
moderate cares (whether they
concerne our particular or the
common wealth, or our friends)
are not blamed. But herein is a
twofold exceſſe, the one when
the chaine or thread of our cares
extended and ſpunne out to an o-
uer great length, and vnto times
too farre off, as if we could bind
the diuine prouidence by our
prouiſions, which euen with the
heathen was alwaies found to be
a thing inſolent and vnluckie, for
thoſe which did attribute much
to forrune, and were ready and
at hand to apprehende with ala-

critie

critie the preſent occaſions, haue for the moſt part in their actions beene happie. But they who in a compaſſe wiſedome haue entred into a confidence that they had belayed all euents, haue for the moſt parte encountred miſfortune. The ſecond exceſſe is, whē we dwel longer in our cares then is requiſite for due deliberating or firme reſoluing: for who is there amongſt vs that careth no more then ſufficeth eyther to reſolue of a courſe, or to conclude vpon an impoſſibilitie, and doth not ſtill chewe ouer the ſame thinges, and treade a mace in the ſame thoughtes, and vaniſheth in them without iſſue or concluſion, which kind of cares are moſt cōtrary to all diuine and humane reſpects.

Of earthly hope.

Better is the sight of the eye, then the apprehension of the mind.

PVre sence receiuing euery thing acording to the naturall impression makes a better state and gouernment of the mind then these same imaginations and apprehensions of the mind: for the minde of man hath this nature and propertie, euen in the graueſt and moſt setled wits, that from the sence of euery particular, it doeth as it were bound and spring forward, and take holde of other matters foretelling to it self that all shal proue like vnto that which beateth vpon the present sence: if the sence be of good, it easily runnes into an vn limited hope, and into a like feare, when the sence is of euill, according as is said:

The oracles of hope doth often abuse.

And

And that contrary,

A frowarde ſouthſayer is feare in doubt.

But yet of feare there may bee made ſome vſe, for it prepareth patience, & awaketh induſtry.

No ſhape of ill comes new or ſtrange to me.

All ſorts ſet downe, yea and prepared be

But hope ſeemeth a thing altogether vnprofitable, for to what ende ſerueth this conceit of good. Conſider and note a little if the good fall out leſſe then thou hopeſt, good though it bee, yet leſſe becauſe it is, it ſeemeth rather loſſe then benefite through thy exceſſe of hope: if the good proue equall and proportionable in euent to thy hope, yet the flower thereof by thy hope is gathered, ſo as whē it comes, the grace of it is gone, and it ſeemes vſed & therefore ſooner draweth on ſaciety: admit thy ſucceſſe proue better then thy hope, it is true gaine ſeemes to bee made: but had it

not

not beene better to haue gayned the principall by hoping for nothing then the encreaſe by hoping for leſſe. And this is the operation of Hope in good fortunes, but in miſfortunes it weakeneth all force and vigor of the mind: for neither is there alwaies matter of hope, & if there be, yet if it faile but in part, it doth wholly ouerthrow the conſtancie and reſolution of the mind, & beſides though it doeth carry vs through, yet is it a greater dignitie of mind to beare euilles by fortitude and iudgement, then by a kind of abſenting & alienation of the mind from thinges preſent to thinges future, for that it is to hope. And therefore it was much lightneſſe in the Poets to faine Hope to bee as a counterpoyſon of humaine deceaſes, as to mittigare and aſſwage the fury & anger of them, whereas in deede it doth kindle and enrage them, & cauſeth both doubling of them and relapſes. Notwithſtanding we ſee that the

greateſt

greateſt nũber of men giue themſelues ouer to their imaginations of hope & apprehenſions of the mind, in ſuch ſort that vngratefull towards thinges paſt, and in a manner vnmindfull of things preſent, as if they were euer children and beginners, they are ſtill in longing for things to come. *I ſaw all men walking vnder the ſunne reſort & gather to the ſecond perſon, which was afterwardes to ſucceede, this is an euill diſeaſe & a great ſadneſſe of the mind.*

But perhaps you will aske the queſtion, whether it be not better when thinges ſtand in doubtfull termes, to preſume the beſt, and rather hope wel then diſtruſt, ſpecially ſeeing that hope doeth cauſe a greater tranquillitie of minde.

Surely I doe iudge a ſtate of minde, which in all doubtfull expectations is ſetled & floteth not, and doeth this out of a good gouernment and compoſition of the affections, to be one of the prin-

cipall

cipall ſupports of mans life: But that aſſurance and repoſe of the mind, which onely rides at ancor vpon hope. I do reiect as wauering and weake, not that it is not conuenient to foreſee & preſuppoſe out of a ſound & ſober coniecture as well the good as the euill, that thereby we may fit our actions to the probabilities and likelihoods of their euent, ſo that this be a worke of the vnderſtanding and iudgement with a due bent and inclination of the affection: But which of you hath ſo kept his hopes within limites, as when it is ſo that you haue out of a watchfull and ſtrong diſcourſe of the mind ſet downe the better ſucceſſe to bee in apparancy the more likely you haue not dwelt vpō the very muſe & forethought of the good to come and giuing ſcope and fauour to your minde to fall into ſuch cogitations as into a pleaſant dreame: and this it is which makes the mind light frothy, vnequall and wandring:

where

wherefore all our hope is to bee bestowed vpon the heauenly life to come. But here on earth the purer our sence is from the infection and tincture of imagination, the better and the wiser ioule.

The summe of life to little doth amount,
And therefore doth forbidde a longer count.

Of Hipocrites.

I demand mercy and not sacrifice.

ALl the boasting of the Hipocrite is of the workes of the first table of the law, which is of adoration and dutie towardes God: wherof the reason is double both because such workes haue a greater pompe and demonstratiō of holinesse, & also because they doe

do leſſe croſſe their affections & deſires, therefore the way to conuict Hipocrites, is to ſende them from the workes of ſacrifice to the workes of mercy, whence commeth that ſaying.

This is pure and imaculate religion with God the father, to viſite Orphanes and widowes in their tribulations. And that ſaying: *He that loueth not his brother whome he hath ſeene, how can hee loue God whom hee hath not ſeene.*

Now there is another kind of deeper and more extrauagant hipocriſie, for ſome deceiuing themſelues, and thinking themſelues worthy of a more neere acceſſe & conuerſatiō with God do neglect the duties of charity towards their neighbour, as inferior matters, which did not in deede cauſe originally the beginning of a monaſticall life (for the beginnings were good) but brought in that exceſſe and abuſe which are followed after: for it is truly ſaid, *That the office of praying is a great office in the*

Church

Church. And it is for the good of the Church, that there bee consorts of men freed from the cares of this world, who may with dayly and deuout supplications and obseruances solicite the diuine maiestie, for the causes of the Church. But vnto this ordinance that other Hipocrisie is a nigh neyghbour, neyther is the generall institution to be blamed, but those spirites which exalt themselues too high to be refrained: for euen *Enoch* which was saide to walke with God, did propheſie, as is deliuered vnto vs by Iude, and did indowe the Church with the fruite of his propheſie which hee left: and Iohn Baptist, vnto whō they did referre as to the authour of a monasticall life, trauailed and exercised much in the ministerie both of propheſie and baptizing, for as to these others who are so officious towards God, to thē belongeth that question: *If thou do iustly what is that to God, or what profite doeth he take by thy handes?* where-

wherefore the workes of mercy are they which are the workes of distinction, whereby to finde out Hypocrites. But with Heretikes it is contrary, for as Hipocrites with their dissembling holinesse towards God doe palliate and couer their iniuries towardes men: So Heretikes by their moralitie & honest carriage towardes men insinuate and make way for their blasphemies against God.

Of Impostors.

Whether we be transported in mind it is to Godward.
Or whether we be sober it is to yowardes.

THis is the true image and true temper of a man, and of him that is Gods faithfull workeman, his carriage and conuersation towardes God is full of passion, of zeale

zeale and of tramisses, thence proceed grones vnspeakeable, & exultinges, likewise in comfort, rauishment of spirit and agonies. But contrariwise his cariage and conuersation towards men is full of mildnesse, sobrietie, and appliable demeanor. Hence is that saying, I *am become all things to all men*, and such like. Contrary it is with Hipocrites & Impostors, for they in the church and before the people set themselues on fire, & are caried as it were out of themselues, and becomming as men inspired with holy furies, they set heauen and earth together: but if a man did see their solitarie & seperate meditations, and conuersation whereunto God is onely priuy, he might towards God find them not onely cold and without vertue, but also full of ill nature, and leauen: *Sober enough to God, and transported onely towards men.*

Of the ſeuerall kinds of Impoſture.

Auoid prophane ſtrangenes of wordes and oppoſitions of knowledge, falſely ſo called.
Auoid fond and idle fables:
Let no man deceiue you by high ſpeech:

THere are three formes of ſpeaking, which are as it were the ſtile and phraſe of impoſture: the firſt kind is of them, who as ſoone as they haue gotten any ſubiect or matter, doe ſtraight caſt it into an arte, inuenting newe tearmes of art, reducing all into diuiſions and diſtinctions, thence drawing aſſertions or poſitions, and ſo framing oppoſitions by queſtions & anſweres, hence iſſueth the cop-webbes and clatterings of the Schoolemen.

The ſeconde kinde is of them who

who out of the vanity of their wit (as Church poets) doe make and deuiſe all variety of tales, ſtories, and examples, whereby they may leade mens mindes to a beliefe, from whence did growe the Legendes and infinite fabulous inuentions and dreames of the ancient heretikes.

The third kinde is of them, who fill mens ears with miſteries, high parables, Allegories, and illuſions: which miſticall & profound ſorme many of the hereticks haue alſo made choyce of. By the firſt kind of theſe, the capacitie & wit of man is fettered and entangled: by the ſeconde it is trayned on and inueigled: by the thirde it is aſtoniſhed & enchanted, but by euery of them the while it is ſeduced and abuſed.

Of Atheiſme.

The foole hath ſaid in his heart there is no God.

FIrſt it is to be noted that the Scripture ſaith, the foole hath ſaid in his heart, and not he hath thought in his heart, that is to ſay, he doth not ſo fully thinke it in iudgement, as he hath a good will to bee of that beliefe, for ſeeing it it makes not for him that there ſhoulde bee a God, hee doeth ſeeke by all meanes accordingly, to perſuade and reſolue himſelfe, and ſtudies to affirme, proue and verifie it to himſelfe as ſome theame or poſition, al which labor, notwithſtanding that ſparkle of our creation light, whereby men acknowledge a Deitie, burneth ſtill within, and in vayne doth he ſtriue vtterly to alienate it or put it out, ſo that it is out of the cor-

ruption

ruption of his heart and will, and not out of the naturall apprehenſion of his braine & conceit, that he doth ſet downe his opinion, as the comicall Poet ſaith: *Then came my mind to bee of mine opinion*, as it himſelfe and his mind had beene two diuers things: Therefore the Atheiſt hath rather ſaide and helde it in his heart, then thought or belieued in his heart that there is no God. Secondly it is to be obſerued, that hee hath ſaid in his heart, and not ſpoken it with his mouth. But again you ſhall note, that this ſmothering of this perſwaſion within the hart commeth to paſſe for feare of gouernment and of ſpeech amongſt men: for as he ſaith, *To deny God in a publike argument were much, but in a familiar conference were currant enough.* For if this bridle were remoued, there is no hereſie which would contende more to ſpread and multiply, and diſſeminate it ſelfe abroad then atheiſme, neither ſhall you ſee thoſe men

which are drencht in this frenſie of minde to breath almoſt any thing els, or to inculcate euen without occaſion, any thing more then ſpeech tending to Atheiſme, as may appeare in Lucreſias the Epicure, who makes of his inuectiues againſt religion, as it were a burthen or verſe of returne to all his other diſcourſes: the reaſon ſeemes to bee, for that the Atheiſt not relying ſufficiently vpon himſelf, floting in mind, & vnſatisfied and induring within many faintings, & as it were fals of his opinion, deſires by other mens opinions agreeing with his to be recouered and brought againe: for it is a true ſaying:

Who ſo laboureth earneſtly to proue an opinion to an other, himſelfe diſtruſts it.

Thirdly, it is a foole that hath ſo ſaide in his heart, which is moſt true, not onely in reſpect that he hath no taſte in thoſe thinges which are ſupernaturall and di-

uine:

uine: but in reſpect of humane and ciuile wiſedome: for firſt of all, if you marke the wits and diſpoſitions which are inclyned to Atheiſme, you ſhall finde them light, ſcoffing, impudent, and vayne: briefly, of ſuch a conſtitution, as is moſt contrarie to wiſedome and morall grauitie. Secondly, amongſt ſtates men & politikes, thoſe which haue been of greateſt depths, and compaſſe, and of largeſt & moſt vniuerſall vnderſtanding, haue not onely in cunning made their profit in ſeeming religious to the people, but in truth haue beene toucht with an inwarde ſence of the knowledge of Dyetie, as they which you ſhall euermore note to haue attributed much to fortune and prouidence.

Contrariwiſe, thoſe who aſcribed all thinges to their owne cunninges and practiſes, and to the immediate and apparant cauſes: and as the Prophet ſaith, *haue ſacrificed to their owne nets*, haue

beene alwaies but petty counterfait ſtates men, and not capable of the greateſt actions. Laſtly, this I dare affirme in knowledge of nature, that a little naturall philoſophie: and the firſt entrance into it doth diſpoſe the opinion to Atheiſme: But on the other ſide much naturall philoſophie, and wading deepe into it, will bring about mens mindes to religion: wherefore Atheiſme euery way ſeems to be ioined & combined with folly and ignorance, ſee that nothing can bee more iuſtly allotted to be the ſaying of fooles then this, *there is no God.*

Of Hereſies.

You erre not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God.

THis Cannon is the mother of al Canons againſt Hereſie: The cauſes of errour are two: the ignorance of the

the wil of God, and the ignorance or nor sufficient consideration of his power, the will of God is more reuealed by the Scriptures, and therefore the precepte is, *Search the Scriptures*: the will of God is more reuealed by the creatures, and therefore the precept is: *Beholde and consider the creatures*: So is the fulnesse of the power of God to bee affirmed, as wee make no imputation to his will, so is the goodnesse of the will of God to be affirmed, as wee make no derogation from his power: Therefore true religion seated in the meane betwixt Superstition, with superstitious heresies on the one side, & Atheisme, with prophane heresies on the other: Superstition reiecting the light of the scriptures, and giuing of it self ouer to vngrounded traditions and writinges doubtfull and not Canonicall, or to newe reuelations, or to vntrue interpretations of the Scriptures thé-selues doth forge & dreame ma-

ny thinges of the will of God, which are ſtrange and farre diſtant from the true ſence of the ſcriptures: But Atheiſme and Theomachie rebelleth and mutineth againſt the power of God, giuing no faith to his worde, which reuealeth his will, vpon a diſcredit and vnbeliefe of his power, to whom all thinges are poſſible. Now thoſe hereſies which ſpring out of this fountain ſeeme more haynous then the other: for euen in ciuile gouernment it is held an offence in a higher degree to deny the power and authority of a prince, then to touch his honour and fame. Of theſe hereſies which derogate from the power of God beſide plain atheiſme, there are three degrees, and they haue all one & the ſame miſtery: for all Antichriſtianity worketh in a miſterie, that is, vnder the ſhadow of good, and it is this to free and deliuer the will of God from all imputation and aſperſion of ill. The firſt degree is of

thoſe

thoſe who make and ſuppoſe two principles contrary and fighting one againſt the other, the one of good, the other of euill.

The ſecond degree is of them to whome the Maieſtie of God ſeemes too much wronged in ſetting vppe and erecting againſt him another aduerſe and oppoſite principle, namely ſuch a principle as ſhould bee actiue and affimatiue, that is to ſay, cauſe or fountaine of any eſſence or being: therefore reiecting all ſuch preſumption they doe neuertheleſſe bring in againſt God: a principle negatiue and priuatiue, that is a cauſe of not being and ſubſiſting, for they will haue it to be an inbred proper worke, and nature of the matter & creature it ſelfe, of it ſelfe to turne againe and reſolue into confuſion and nothing, not knowing that it is an effect of one and the ſame omnipotencie,

to

to make nothing of ſomewhat, as to make ſomewhat of nothing. The third degree is of thoſe, who abridge and reſtraine the former opinion onely to thoſe humane actions which pertake of ſinne: which actions, they will haue to depende ſubſtantiuely and originally, and without any ſequele or ſubordination of cauſes vpon the will, and make and ſet downe and appoint larger limites of the knowledge of God then of his power, or rather of that parte of Gods power (for knowledge it ſelfe is a power whereby he knoweth) then of that by which hee moueth & worketh, making him foreknow ſome thinges idlie and as a looker on, which hee doeth not predeſtinate nor ordayne: Not vnlike to that deuiſe which Epicurus brought into Democritus opinion, to take away deſtinie and make way to Fortune, to witte, the ſtart and ſlippe of Attemus, which alwaies of the wiſer ſort was reiected as a moſt friuolous

lous ſhift. But whatſoeuer depends not of God, as Author and Principle by inferiour linkes and degrees, that muſt needes bee in place of God, and a new principle, and a certaine vſurping God: wherefore worthely is that opinion refuſed as an indignitie and derogation to the maieſtie and power of God, and yet it is moſt truely affirmed, that God is not the author of euill, not becauſe he is not author, but becauſe not as of euill.

Of the Church and the Scriptures.

Thou ſhalt protect them in thy tabernacle, from the contradiction of tongues.

THe contradiction of tongues doeth euery where meet with vs out of the tabernacle of God, there-

therefore whither ſoeuer thou ſhalt turne thy ſelf, thou ſhalt find no ende of controuerſies, except thou withdraw thy ſelfe into that tabernacle, thou wilt ſay, t'is true, and that it is to bee vnderſtood of the vnitie of the church: But heare and note, there was in the tabernacle the Arke, and in the Arke the teſtimony or tables of the lawe: what doeſt thou tell me of the huske of the tabernacle without the kernel of the teſtimonie. The tabernacle was ordained for the keeping and deliuering ouer from hand to hande of the teſtimony. In like manner the cuſtodie & paſſing ouer of the ſcriptures is committed vnto the Church. But the life of the tabernacle is the teſtimony.

OF
The Colours of good and euill, a fragment.

1598.

1 CVi cetera partes vel secta secundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum singula principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quaque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero tribuere.

2 Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.

3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quám quod ad opinionē. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet hac est. Quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset.

4 Quod rē integrā seruat bonū, quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentia genus est, potentia autem bonum.

5 Quod ex pluribus constat, & diuisibilius est maius quám quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur: quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinem pra se fert, fortiùs autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem.

6 Cuius priuatio bona, malum, eius

ius privatio mala, bonum.

7 Quod bono vicinum bonum, quod a bono remotum, malum.

8 Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.

9 Quod opera, & virtute nostra partum est, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortuna delatum est, minus bonum.

10 Gradus privationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur, quàm gradus incrementi.

In

IN deliberatiues the pointe is what is good, & what is euil, and of good what is greater, & of euill what is leſſe.

So that the perſuaders labour is to make thinges appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may bee performed by true and ſolide reaſons, ſo it may bee repreſented alſo by coulours, popularities and circumſtances, which are of ſuch force, as they ſway the ordinarie iudgement eyther of a weake man, or of

of a wiſe man, not fully & conſiderately attending & pondering the matter. Beſides their power to alter the nature of the ſubiect in appearance, and ſo to leade to errour, they are of no leſſe vſe to quicken and ſtrengthen the opinions and perſuaſions which are true: for reaſons plainely deliuered, and alwaies after one manner eſpecially with fine and faſtidious mindes, enter but heauily and dully: whereas if they bee varied and haue more life & vigor put into them by theſe formes and inſinuations, they cauſe a ſtronger apprehenſion, and

and many times ſuddenly winne the mind to a reſolution. Laſtly, to make a true & ſafe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vſe and defence to the minde, then the diſcouering and reprehenſion of theſe colours, ſhewing in what caſes they hold, and in what they deceyue: which as it cannot be done, but out of a very vniuerſall knowledge of the nature of thinges, ſo being performed, it ſo cleereth mans iudgement and election, as it is the leſſe apt to ſlide into any errour.

A Table of the Colours, or apparances of good and euill, and their degrees, as places of perſwaſion and diſſwaſion, and their ſeuerall fallaxes, and the elenches of them.

Cui cetera partes vel ſecta ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingula principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur, nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.

SO Cicero went about to proue the ſecte of Academiques which ſuſpended all aſſeueration, for to bee the beſt: for ſaith hee, aske a Stoicke which philoſophie is true, he will preferre his owne. Then aske him which approcheth next the truth, hee will confeſſe the Academiques. So deale with the Epicure that will ſcant indure the Stoicke to be in

ſight of him, as ſoone as hee hath placed himſelfe, he will place the Academiques next him.

So if a Prince took diuers competitors to a place, and examined thé ſeuerally, whom next themſelues they woulde ratheſt commend, it were like the ableſt man ſhould haue the moſt ſecond votes.

The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in reſpect of enuie, for men are accuſtomed after themſelues and their owne faction to incline to them which are ſoſteſt, and are leaſt in their way in deſpight and derogation of them that holde them hardeſt to it. So that this colour of melioritie and preheminence is of a ſigne of eneruation and weakeneſſe.

2. *Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.*

APpertaining to this are the formes: *Let vs not wander*

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in generalities: let vs compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance though it ſeeme of ſtrength, and rather Logical then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a fallax,

Sometime becauſe ſome things are in kinde very caſuall, which if they eſcape, proue excellent, ſo that the kind is inferiour, becauſe it is ſo ſubiect to perill, but that which is excellent being proued is ſuperior, as the bloſſome of March and the bloſſome of May, whereof the French verſe goeth.

Burgeon de Mars enfant de Paris.
Si vn eſchape, il en vaut dix.

So that the bloſſome of May is generally better then the bloſſome of March, and yet the beſt bloſſome of March is better then the beſt bloſſome of May.

Sometimes becauſe the nature of ſome kindes is to bee more equall & more indifferent, and not to haue very diſtant degrees, as hath beene noted in the warmer climates,

clymates, the people are generally more wiſe, but in the Northern clymate the wittes of chiefe are greater. So in many Armies, if the matter ſhould bee tried by duell betweene two Champions, the victory ſhould go on the one ſide, and yet if it bee tryed by the groſſe, it would goe of the other ſide: for excellencies go as it were by chaunce, but kindes goe by a more certaine nature, as by diſcipline in warre.

Laſtly many kindes haue much refuſe, which counteruaile that which they haue excellent, and therefore generally mettall is more precious then Stone, & yet a Diamond is more precious then gold.

3 *Quod ad veritatem refertur magis eſt quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius, quod ad opinionem pertinet, hæc eſt quod quis ſe iam putaret fore, ſacturus non eſſet.*

So

SO the Epicures ſay of the Stoickes felicitie placed in vertue, That it is like the felicity of a plaier, who if he were left of his auditory and their applauſe, he would ſtraight be out of hart and countenance, and therefore they call vertue *Bonum theatrale*. But of riches the Poet ſaith:

Populus me ſibilat,
At mihi plaudo.

And of pleaſure.

Grata ſub imo
Gaudia corde prement, vultu
ſimulare puderem.

The Fallax of this colour is ſomewhat ſubtile, though the anſwere to the example be ready, for vertue is not choſen *propter auram popularem*. But contrariwiſe, *Maxime omnium teipſum reuerere*, So as a vertuous man wil be vertuous in *ſolitudine*, and not onely in *theatro*, though percaſe it will bee more ſtrong by glorie and fame, as an heate which is dou-

bled by reflection: But that denieth the ſuppoſition, it doeth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehenſion is Alow, that vertue (ſuch as is ioyned with labor and conflict) would not bee choſen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chiefe motiue of the election ſhould not be real & for it ſelf, for fame may be onely *cauſa impulſiua*, and not *cauſa conſtituens*, or *efficiens*. As if there were two horſes, and the one woulde doo better without the ſpurre then the other: but againe the other with the ſpurre woulde farre exceede the doing of the former, giuing him the ſpur alſo, yet the latter will be iudged to bee the better horſe, and the forme as to ſay, *Tuſh, the life of that horſe is but in the ſpurre*, will no: ſerue as to a wiſe iudgement: For ſince the ordinary inſtrument of horſemanſhip is the ſpur, & that it is no manner of impediment, nor burden, the horſe is not to be recounted the leſſe of, which

will

wil not do wel without the ſpur, but rather the other is to bee reckoned a delicacy then a vertue, ſo glory and honour are the ſpurres to vertue, and although vertue would languiſh without them, yet ſince they be alwaies at hande to attend vertue, vertue is not to be ſaid the leſſe choſen for it ſelf, becauſe it needeth the ſpur of fame & reputation: and therefore that poſition, *Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatem eligitur, hac eſt, quod quis ſi clam putaret fore, facturus non eſſet* is reprehended.

4 *Quod rem integram ſeruat bonum, quod ſine recepto eſt malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentia genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.*

HEreof Aeſope framed the fable of the two Frogges that conſulted together in time of drowth (when many plaſhes that they had repayred to) were dry what

was to be done, and the one propounded to go down into a deep Well, becauſe it was like the water would not faile there, but the other anſwered, yea but if it doe faile, how ſhal we get vp againe? And the reaſon is, that humane actions are ſo vncertaine and ſubiect to perils, as that ſeemeth the beſt courſe which hath moſt paſſages out of it.

Appertayning to this perſwaſion the formes are, *you ſhall ingage your ſelfe*, On the other ſide, *Tantum, quantum volet, ſumes ex fortuna*, you ſhall keepe the matter in your owne hands. The reprehenſion of it is, *that proceeding and reſoluing in all actions is neceſſary*: For as he ſaith well, *not to reſolue, is to reſolue*, & many times it breedes as many neceſſities, & ingageth as farre in ſome other ſort as to reſolue.

So it is but the couetous mans diſeaſe tranſlated into power, for the couetous man will enioy nothing becauſe he will haue his full

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ſtore and poſſibility to inioy the more, ſo by this reaſon a man ſhoulde execute nothing becauſe he ſhould be ſtill indifferent and at libertie to execute any thing. Beſides neceſſitie and this ſame *ſalta eſt alea* hath many times an aduantage, becauſe it awaketh the powers of the mind, & ſtrengtheneth indeauour. *Caeteris paret neceſſitate certe ſuperiores eſtis.*

5 Quod ex pluribus conſtat et diuiſibilius eſt maius quam quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes conſiderata maiora videntur, quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinē præſefert, fortius autē operatur pluralitas partium ſi ordo abſit, nam inducit ſimilitudinem infinitis & impedit comprehenſionem.

THis colour ſeemeth palpable, for it is not pluralitie of parts without maiority of parts that maketh the totall greater, yet ne-

wertheleſſe it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiueth the ſence, as it ſeemeth to the eye a ſhorter diſtance of way if it bee all dead and continued, then if it haue trees or buildings, or any other marks whereby the eye may diuide it. So when a great monied man hath deuided his cheſtes and coynes, and bagges, hee ſeemeth to himſelfe richer then hee was, and therefore a way to amplifie any thing, is to breake it, & to make an anotomie of it in ſeuerall partes, and to examine it according to ſeuerall circumſtances. And this maketh the greater ſhew if it be done without order, for confuſion maketh things muſter more, and beſides what is ſet downe by order and diuiſion doeth demonſtrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there, whereas if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth leſſe that which is ſet downe, and beſides it leaueth a ſuſpition, as if more might bee

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ſaide then is expreſſed.

This colour deceyueth, if the mind of him that is to be perſuaded, doe of it ſelfe ouer-conceiue or preiudge of the greatneſſe of any thing, for then the breaking of it will make it ſeeme leſſe, becauſe it maketh it appeare more according to the truth, and therefore if a man bee in ſickneſſe or paine, the time will ſeeme longer without a clocke or hower glaſſe then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the hower doth rather ſumme vp the momentes then diuide the day. So in a dead plaine, the way ſeemeth the longer, becauſe the eye hath preconceiued it ſhorter then the truth: & the fruſtrating of that maketh it ſeeme longer then the truth. Therefore if any man haue an ouer great opinion of any thing, then if an other thinke by breaking it into ſeuerall conſiderations, hee ſhall make it ſeeme greater to him, hee will be deceyued, and there-

fore in ſuch caſes it is not ſafe to diuide, but to extoll the entire ſtill in generall.

Another caſe wherein this Colour deceiueth, is, when the matter broke or diuided is not comprehended by the ſence or mind at once in reſpect of the diſtracting or ſcattering of it, and being intire and not diuided, is comprehended, as a hundred pounds in heapes of fiue pounds wil ſhew more then in one groſſe heape, ſo as the heapes be all vpon one table to be ſeene at once, otherwiſe not, as flowers growing ſcattered in diuers beds wil ſhew more then if they did grow in one bed, ſo as all thoſe beddes be within a plot that they bee obiect to view at once, otherwiſe not: & therefore men whoſe liuing lyeth together in one ſhire, are commonly counted greater landed then thoſe whoſe liuings are diſperſed, though it be more, becauſe of the notice and comprehenſion,

A third caſe wherin this colour deceyueth

deceyueth, and it is not ſo properly a caſe or reprehenſion, as it is a countercolour being in effect as large as the colour it ſelf, and that is, *Omnis compoſitio indigentia cuiuſdam videtur eſſe particeps*, becauſe if one thing woulde ſerue the turne it were euer beſt, but the defect and imperfections of thinges hath brought in that helpe to piece them vppe as it is ſaide, *Martha, Martha attendis ad plurima, vnum ſufficit.* So likewiſe hereupon Aeſope framed the fable of the Fox and the Catte, whereas the Foxe bragged what a number of ſhiftes and deuiſes hee had to gette from the hounds, and the Cat ſaide ſhe had but one, which was to clime a tree, which in proofe was better worth then all the reſt, whereof the Prouerbe grew, *Multa nouit Vulpes, ſed Felis vnum magnum.* And in the morall of this fable it comes likewiſe to paſſe: That a good ſure friend is a better help at a pinch, then all the ſtratagems

and pollicies of a mans own wit. So it faileth out to be a common errour in negociating, whereas men haue many reaſons to induce or perſuade, they ſtriue commonly to vtter and vſe them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth as was ſaid, a needineſſe in euery of the reaſons by it ſelfe, as if one did not truſt to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himſelfe onely with that. *Et qua non proſunt ſingula multa iuuant.* Indeed in a ſet ſpeech in an aſſemblie it is expected a man ſhoulde vſe all his reaſons in the caſe hee handleth, but in priuate perſuaſions it is alwaies a great errour.

A fourth caſe wherein this colour may bee reprehended is in reſpect of that ſame *Vis Vnita fortior*, according to the tale of the French King, that when the Emperours Ambaſſador had recited his maiſters ſtile at large, which conſiſteth of many countries and dominions: the French King wil-

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led his Chauncellor or other minister to repeate and say ouer Fraunce as many times as the other had recited the seuerall dominions, intending it was equiualent with them all, and beside more compacted and vnited.

There is also appertayning to this colour an other point, why breaking of a thing doth helpe it, not by way of adding a shew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellencie and raritie: whereof the formes are, *where shal you find such a concurrence? great but not compleate*, for it seemes a lesse worke of nature or fortune to make any thing in his kinde greater then ordinary, then to make a strange composition. Yet if it be narowly considered, this colour will be reprehended or incoũtred by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kinde of pouerty or at least a casualty or ieopardy, for frõ that which is excellent in greatnes somewhat may be taken or there may bee decay, and yet

sufficī-

ſufficiencie left, but from that which hath his price in compoſition if you take away any thing, or any parte doe faile, all is diſgraced.

6 *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.*

THe formes to make it conceyued that that was euill which is chaunged for the better are: *He that is in hell thinkes there is, no other heauen. Satis quercus, Acornes were good till breade was founde.* &c. And of the other ſide the formes to make it conceyued, that that was good which was changed for the worſe are, *bona magis carendo quam ſeruando ſentimus: bona a tergo formoſiſsima, Good things neuer appeare in their full beauty, till they turne their backe, and bee going away.* &c. The reprehenſion of this colour is, that the good or euill which is remoued may bee eſteemed good or euill comparatiuely, and not

not positiuely or simply. So that if the priuatiō be good, it follows not the former condition was euill, but lesse good, for the flower or blossom, is a positiue good, although the remoue of it to giue place to the fruite be a comparatiue good. So in the tale of Æsope when the olde fainting man in the heate of the day cast down his burthen and called for death, and when death came to knowe his will with him, saide it was for nothing, but to helpe him vp with his burthen againe: it doth not follow that becausse death which was the priuation of the burthen was ill, therefore the burthen was good. And in this part the ordinarie forme of *Malum necessarium* aptly reprehendeth this colour, for *Priuatio mali necessarii est malum*, and yet that doth not conuert the nature of the necessarie euill, but it is euill.

Againe it commeth sometimes to passe, that there is an equalitie

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in the change or priuation, and as it were a *Dilemma boni*, or a *Dilemma mali*, so that the corruption of the one good is a generation of the other, *Sorti pater æquus Fortique est*: And contrary the remedy of the one euill is the occasion and commencement of an other, as in *Scilla* and *Charibdis*.

7 *Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod a bono remotum, malum.*

SVch is the nature of thinges, that thinges contrarie and distant in nature and qualitie are also seuered and disioyned in place, and thinges like and consenting in qualitie are placed, and as it were quarterd together, for partly in regard of the nature to spred, multiplie, and infect in similitude, and partlie in regarde of the nature to breake expell and alter that which

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is disagreeable and contrary, most thinges doe eyther associate and drawe neere to themselues the like, or at least assimilate to themselues that which approacheth neere them, and doe also driue away, chase, and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reason commonly yeelded why the middle region of the aire shoulde bee coldest, because the Sunne and Starres are eyther hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct beames heate the vpper region, the reflected beames from the earth and seas heate the lower Region. That which is in the middest being furthest distant in place from these two regions of heate are most distant in nature that is coldest, which is that they tearme colde or hot, *per antiperasin*, that is, inuironing by contraries, which was pleasantly taken hold of by him that saide that an honest man in these dayes must needes be more honest then in a-

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ges heretofore, *propter antiperistasin*, because the shutting of him in the midd[illegible] of contraries must needes make the honestie stronger and more compact in it selfe. The reprehension of this colour is, first many thinges of amplitude in their kinde do as it were ingrosse to themselues all, and leaue that which is next them most destitute, as the shootes or vnderwood that grow neare a great & spread tree, is the most pyned and shrubbie wood of the field, because the greate tree doth depriue and deceiue them of the sap & nourishment, so he saith wel, *Diuites serui maxime serui*: and the comparison was pleasant of him that compared courtiers attendant in the courts of princes, without greate place or office to fasting dayes, which were next the holy dayes, but otherwise were the leaneſt dayes in all the weeke.

An other reprehension is, that thinges of greatnesse and pred-

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minancie, though they do not extenuate the thinges adioyning in ſubſtance, yet they drowne them and obſcure them in ſhew and appearance, and therefore the aſtronomers ſay, that whereas in al other planets coniunction is the perfectest amitie: the Sunne contrariwiſe is good by aſpect, but euill by coniunction.

A third reprehenſion is, becauſe euill approacheth to good ſometimes for concealement, ſometimes for protection, and good to euill, for conuerſion and reformation. So hipocriſie draweth neere to religion for couert and hiding it ſelfe: *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni*, & Sanctuarie men which were commonly inordinate men, and malefactors, were wont to be neereſt to Prieſtes and prelates & holy men, for the maieſtie of good thinges is ſuch, as the confines of them are reuered. On the other ſide our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicanes and Rio-

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ters said, *The Phisitian approacheth the sicke, rather then the whole.*

8 *Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

THe reasonis, because the sting & remorse of the mind accusing it selfe doubleth all aduersitie, contrariwise the considering and recording inwardly, that a man is clear and free from fault, and iust imputation, doth attemper outward calamities: For if the euill bee in the sence and in the conscience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euil be in the one and comfort in the other, it is a kind of cōpensation, so the Poets in tragedies do make the most passionate lamentations, and those that forerun finall dispaire, to be accusing questioning, and torturing of a mans selfe.

Seque vnum clamat causamque caput-

patque malorum. And contrariwise the extremities of worthy persons haue beene annihilated in the consideration of their owne good deseruing. Besides, when the euill commeth from without, there is left a kind of enaporation of griefe, if it come by humane iniurie eyther by indignation and meditating of reuenge from our selues, or by expecting or foreconceiuing that *Nemesis* and retribution will take holde of the authors of our hurt, or if it be by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kind of expostulation against the diuine powers. *Atque Deos atque astra vocat crudelia mater.*

But where the euill is deriued from a mans own fault, there all strikes deadly inwards, & suffocateth The reprehension of this colour is first in respect of hope, for reformation of our faultes is in *nostra potestate*, but amendement of our fortune simplie is not. Therefore *Demosthenes* in manie

many of his orations sayeth thus to the people of *Athens*, *That which hauing regard to the time past is the worst point and circumstance of all the rest, that as to the time to come is the best: What is that? Euen this, that by your sloth, irresolution, and misgouernment, your affaires are growne to this declination, and decay. For had you vsed and ordered your meanes and forces to the best, and done your parts euery way to the full, and notwithstanding your matters shoul thaue gone backwarder in this maner as they doe, there had beene no hope left of recouerie or reparation, but since it hath beene onely by your owne errors, &c.* So *Epictetus* in his degrees saith, *The worst state of man is to accuse extern things, better then that to accuse a mans selfe, and best of all to accuse neither.*

An other reprehension of this colour is in respect of the well bearing of euils, wherewith a man can charge no body but himselfe, which maketh them the lesse.

Leue fit quod bene fertur onus.

And

And therefore many natures, that are eyther extreamely proude, and will take no fault to themselues, or else very true, and cleauing to themselues (when they see the blame of any thing that fals out ill must light vpon themselues) haue no other shift but to beare it out well, and to make the least of it, for as we see when somtimes a fault is committed, and before it be knowne, who is to blame, much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to bee done by a sonne, or by a wife, or by a neare friend, then it is light made of. So much more whé a man must take it vpon himselfe. And therefore it is commonly seene that women that marrie husbandes of their own chusing against their frendes consents, if they be neuer so ill vsed, yet you shall seldome see them complaine, but to set a good face on it.

9 Quod opera & virtute noſtra partum eſt maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum eſt minus bonum.

THe reaſons are firſt the future hope, becauſe in the fauoures of others or the good windes of fortune we haue no ſtate or certainety in our indeuours or abilities we haue. So as when they haue purchaſed vs one good fortune, we haue them as readie and better edged and inured to procure an other.

The formes be, *you haue wonne this by play, you haue not eneby the water, but you haue the receipt, you can make it againe if it be loſt &c.*

Next becauſe theſe properties which we enioy by the benefit of others, carrie with them an obligation, which ſeemeth a kinde of burthen, whereas the other which deriue from our ſelues are like the freeſt parents, *abſque aliquo onere*

inde reddendo, and if they proceed from fortune or prouidence, yet they seeme to touch vs secretly with the reuerence of the diuine powers whose fauours wee taste and therefore worke a kinde of religious feare and restraint, whereas in the other kind, that comes to passe, which the prophet speaketh. *Lætantur & exultant, immolant plagis suis, & sacrificant reti suo.*

Thirdly, because that which cõmeth vnto vs without our owne virtue, yeeldeth not that commẽdation and reputation, for actions of greate felicitie may draw wonder, but praiseleſſe, as *Cicero* saide to *Cæsar*, *qua miremur, habemus, qua laudemus expectamus.*

Fourthly, because the purchases of our owne industrie are ioyned commonly with labour and strife which giues an edge and appetite and makes the fruition of our desire more pleasant, *Suauis cibus a fame.*

On the other side there be fower counter colours to this colour rather thé reprehensions, because they bee as large as the colour it selfe, first because felicity seemeth to be a character of the fauour & loue of the diuine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in our selues and respect and authority from others. And this felicitie extendeth to many casuall things, whereunto the care or vertue of man cannot extende, & therefore seemeth to be a large good, as when *Cæsar* saide to the sayler, *Cæsarem portas et fortunam eius*, if hee had saide, *& Virtutem eius*, it had beene small comfort against a tempest, otherwise then if it might seeme vpon merite to induce fortune.

Next, whatsoeuer is done by vertue and industrie, seemes to be done by a kind of habite and arte, and thereupon open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicitie is imitable: so we generally

ly see, that things of nature seeme more excellent then thinges of art, because they be imitable: for, *quod imitabile est, potentia quadam vulgatum est.*

Thirdly felicity commendeth those thinges which commeth without our own labour, for they seeme gifts, and the other seemes penyworthes: whereupon *Plutarch* sayeth elegantly of the actes of *Timoleon* who was so fortunat, compared with the acts of *Agesilaus* and *Epaminondas*, *that they were like Homers verses they ranne so easilie and so well.* And therefore it is the word wee giue vnto poesie terming it a happy veine, because facilitie seemeth euer to come from happinesse.

Fourthly, this same *prater spem, vel prater expectatum*, doeth increase the price and pleasure of many thinges, and this

cannot be incident to thoſe things that proceede from our own care and compaſſe.

10 *Gradus privationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis : & rurſus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quàm gradus incrementi.*

IT is a poſition in the Mathematiques that there is no proportion betweene ſomewhat and nothing, therfor:

fore the degree of nullitie and quidditie or act, seemeth larger then the degrees of increase and decrease, as to a monoculos it is more to loose one eye, then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue lost diuers children, it is more griefe to him to loose the last then all the rest: because hee is *spes gregis*, And therefore Sybilla when shee brought her three bookes, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had beene *gradus primationis*, and not *diminutionis*. This colour is reprehended first in those things the vse & seruice whereof resteth in sufficiencie, competencie, or determinate quantitie, as if a man bee to pay one hundreth poundes vpon a penaltie, it is more to him to want xii. pence, then after that xii. pence supposed to bee wanting, to want ten shillinges more: so the decay of a mans estate

seemes to be most touched in the degree when hee first growes behinde, more then afterwardes when hee proues nothing worth. And hereof the common formes are, *Sera in fundo parsimonia*, and as good neuer awhit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, *Corruptio vnius, generatio alterius*: so that *gradus privationis* is many times lesse matter, because it giues the cause, and motiue to some new course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for harkning to the conditiõs offered by king Philip, being not honorable nor equall, hee sayeth they were but elementes of their sloth and weakenesse, which if they were taken away, necessity would teach them stronger resolutions. So Doctor Hector was wont to say to the Dames of London whẽ they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they

coulde

coulde not endure to take any medicine, hee woulde tell them, their way was onely to bee ficke, for then they woulde bee glad to take any medicine.

Thirdly, this colour may bee reprehended, in reſpect that the degree of decreaſe is more ſenſitiue, then the degree of priuaſion, for in the minde of man, *gradus diminutionis* may worke a wauering betweene hope and feare, and ſo keep the mind in ſuſpence from ſetling and accommodating in patience, and reſolution: hereof the common formes are, *Better eye out then alwaies ake*, make or marre &c.

For the ſeconde braunch of this colour, it dependes vppon the ſame generall reaſon: hence grew the common place of extoling the beginning of euery thing. *Dimidium facti qui bene capit*

habet. This made the Aſtrologers ſo idle as to iudge of a mans nature & deſtiny by the conſtellation of the moment of his natiuitie, or conception. This colour is reprehended, becauſe many inceptions are but as Epicurus tearmeth them, *tentamenta*, that is, imperfect offers, and eſſaies, which vaniſh and come to no ſubſtance without any iteration, ſo as in ſuch caſes the ſecond degree ſeemes the worthieſt, as the body horſe in the Carte, that draweth more thē the fore-horſe, hereof the common formes are, *the ſecond blow makes the fray, the ſeconde worde makes the bargaine, alter principium dedit, alter modum abſtulit, &c.* Another reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpect of defatigation, which makes perſeuerance of greater dignity then inception, for chaunce or inſtinct of nature may cauſe inception, but ſetled affection or iudgement

maketh

maketh the continuance.

Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in ſuch thinges which haue a naturall courſe, and inclination contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no ſtart, but there behoueth *perpetua inceptio*, as in the commó forme: *non progredi, eſt regredi, qui non proficit, deficit*, Running againſt the hill: rowing againſt the ſtreame, &c. For if it bee with the ſtreame or with the hill, then the degree of inception is more then all the reſt.

Fourthly, this colour is to bee vnderſtoode of *gradus inceptionis a potentia, ad actum comparatus, cum gradu ab actu ad incrementum*: For otherwiſe, *maior videtur gradus ab impotentia, ad potentiam, quā a potētia ad actum.*

FINIS.

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